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BOOK REVIEW
BOOK REVIEW: CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT
THE HEALTH-CARE CRISIS
THEODORE R. MARMOR*
In the beginning of 2009, there were compelling reasons to
review-and take very seriously-former Senator Tom Daschle's
2008 book about the reform of American medical care.' Then,
Daschle was both Secretary-designate of the Department of
Health and Human Services and President Obama's choice to
lead a White House office devoted to advancing the Administra-
tion's reform plans. What is more, Daschle's co-author of the
book under review, Jeanne Lambrew, had already been
appointed the deputy director of the White House reform office
and many others close to Daschle had positions at the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.2 Following Obama's presi-
dential victory, news reporters regularly described Daschle as the
incoming "Czar" of health reform.' Between November 2008
and January 2009 there were reports of bookstores selling out
their copies of the book Daschle had published to much less
notice in the summer of 2008.' The book's sub-title was clear
about its subject, "What We Can Do About the Health-Care Cri-
sis," and Daschle's close relationship to President Obama further
justified serious attention.
That much was prologue. Then there was the abrupt trans-
formation of Daschle's future: his widely reported tax problems,
initial expressions of support from President Obama and promi-
* Professor Emeritus, Public Policy and Management & Professor Emeri-
tus, Political Science, Yale University.
1. TOM DASCHLE WITH Scort S. GREENBERGER & JEANNE M. LAMBREW,
CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE CRISIs (2008).
2. Robert Pear, Health Care Policy is in Hands of an Ex-Senator, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2008, at A28.
3. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Reshaping White House with a Domestic Focus, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20 2008, at A13.
4. See Bestsellers in Books for January 2009, AMAZON (Jan. 2009), http://
www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/2009-01/books/ref=zg-bsar-cal-ye#4 (listing
CRITICAL at number 74).
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nent Senate Democrats, followed by Daschle's apology to his for-
mer Senate colleagues on February 2, and his quick withdrawal
on February 3.5 For a few days, it was a leading story in American
journalism.
Does Daschle's demise as a central figure in the Obama Cab-
inet lessen interest in this book? It might, but it should not. Crit-
ical is an invaluable guide to the thinking of many in the Obama
Administration who have been central to its health reform
efforts. Kathleen Sebelius, now Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, echoed Daschle's views on health
reform when questioned on her nomination by congressional
committees.' By the end of February 2009, President Obama
had held his Health Reform Summit, reinforcing similar ideas.
He set aside in his budget plan more than $600 billion (over ten
years) to fund complex steps towards universal health insurance,
to improve the quality of American medical care, and to secure
better value for our medical expenditures.' Few outsiders had
any clear idea of how the Obama Administration would pursue
those goals. The insiders, however, many of whom had been in
the Obama health team during the presidential race, were well
versed in the Daschle/Obama approach. That makes Critical an
unusually helpful primer on the assumptions from which the
Obama Administration proceeded during its efforts to reform
American medical care.
The book sets out those assumptions on three crucial topics.
First, what did Democrats like Daschle (and Obama) regard as
the fundamental problems of American medical care? Second,
how did they understand the history of failed attempts at univer-
sal health insurance for American citizens and what lessons from
the past had they learned, especially from the ill-fated reform
attempt of the Clinton Administration in 1993-94? Third, and
most important, what conception of reform was taken for
granted as both desirable and doable-or in the language of this
book-politically feasible and administratively workable?
5. Jeff Zeleny, Daschle Ends Bid for Post; Obama Concedes Mistake, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2009, at Al.
6. The suggestion here is that Daschle's book represented a widely shared
set of ideas, not that he created the ideas. As such, it was no surprise that a new
Cabinet appointee would reflect what was understood to be the Obama position
on health reform.
7. Robert Pear, Obama Offers Broad Plan to Revamp Health Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2009, at A17.
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I. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
The troubles contemporary Americans face with medical
care dominated the opening of Daschle's portrait. "Our [health
care] system is fundamentally broken," he states bluntly. "Mil-
lions of Americans go without medical care because they cannot
afford it, and many others are mired in debt because they can't
pay their medical bills."' He reviews the familiar statistics
describing the number of uninsured and underinsured-esti-
mated as 47 million and 16 million, respectively, in 2008.' But
he goes beyond these numbers to report the miseries of individ-
ual families drawn from both his long political career and the
research for this book. The resulting account of American medi-
cal care is bleak. It costs an enormous amount, whether mea-
sured in per capita terms or as a proportion of national income:
roughly seven thousand dollars per person, over sixteen percent
of GNP, or more than two trillion dollars in total as of 2007.10
These costs have been "skyrocketing" 1 even as the number of
insured Americans has "steadily declined" over time.12 To make
matters worse, Daschle concludes, "[w]e're paying top dollar for
mediocre results."'" Our health status, according to many
informed commentators, does not justify claims that we have the
"best health care in the world."14 The quality of care varies
greatly, mental health is given "short shrift,"" and, while we
"take great pride in our high-tech medical equipment," Ameri-
can medicine's use of information systems is "incredibly
primitive.""
As is common in American political commentary, the lan-
guage of despair and crisis takes over quickly. "Indisputably,"
Daschle writes, "the American public is dissatisfied with the cur-
rent health-care system."" An "overwhelming majority," accord-
ing to the 2007 polls he cites, said American medical care "needs
fundamental change or total reorganization."'" Anything requir-
ing "fundamental change" would appear to justify reform action.
But Daschle here introduces an historical caution that distin-
8. DASCHLE, supra note 1, at xiv.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 21
13. Id. at 38.
14. Id. at 32.
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id.
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guishes hisjeremiad from most critiques of contemporary Ameri-
can medicine. He emphasizes the "similar poll results in the
early 1990s" when the Clinton debacle took place." Reminding
readers that "prominent business leaders [then] expressed sup-
port for the idea of universal insurance," Daschle rightly won-
dered how one can make sure that today's reform movement
"doesn't fall victim to the forces that doomed the previous"
efforts.2 o
There are two other features of this diagnosis worth special
attention. One is that the problems cited were given no particu-
lar priority. There is trouble everywhere in American medical
care. That generates the expectations of "fundamental change,"
which in turn means a fight over what that means. That fight
involves an industry making up one-sixth of the American econ-
omy, the "medical industrial complex."21 It is flush with pressure
groups, and organizations with both the resources and habit of
protecting their interests quite apart from those of the overall
22
system. These realities shaped (and narrowed) the American
health reform debate, as is evident in Daschle's firm rejection of
options like expanding Medicare to the population as a whole.
Critical, published in the early summer of 2008, could not have
taken into account the deepening recession and the extraordi-
nary actions of the federal government in 2009 to loosen the
credit markets, stimulate demand, and cushion unemployment.
It is noteworthy that the Obama Administration remained faith-
ful to a diagnosis crafted in 2007-08 about what to do in the
radically altered fiscal and social circumstances of 2009-10.
The second diagnostic feature is equally consequential. The
country has had decades of experience with failed reforms of
American medical care, Daschle emphasizes, and he devotes a
large share of the book to those disappointments. On that pre-
mise, the critical task for the reviewer is to understand what Das-
chle (and others) learned from what went wrong before and
what would make it right this time.
II. LEARNING FROM THE PAST
Citical devotes close to a third of its pages to "what went
wrong" in past efforts to legislate universal health insurance. For
"almost a century," he writes, "we have tried to reform our
19. Id.
20. Id. at 41-42.
21. See ARNOLD S. REU'mN, A SECOND OPINION: RESCUINc AMEICA'S
HEALTH CARE 26 (2010).
22. Id. at 28.
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healthcare system [and] [d]espite the best efforts of skilled
lawmakers, passionate advocates, and presidents from Truman to
Clinton, we've failed."" Ideological differences, the details of
the reform proposals themselves, and the timing and tactics of
reformers contributed to, but did not determine, failure. For
Daschle, it is the "exceptional" nature of medical care and the
"political process we've followed in trying to" reform it that is
central.2 4 The stakes are high, the interest groups are many and
wealthy, the issues are "incredibly complex," and "[p]owerful
and pervasive myths about the 'success' of our system have
helped reinforce the status quo."2 5 From these premises, Critical
provides an extended discussion of the Clinton Administration's
failure in 1993-94 and what central lessons Daschle, and others,
drew from that particularly disappointing episode.
Daschle, as with many others who supported Obama's
reform strategy, concentrated on the Clinton failure and virtually
ignored the strategy that culminated in the Medicare legislation
of 1965. The lessons Daschle emphasized are those especially
important in explaining the Clinton experience. The reasoning
proceeds in the following steps:
Everybody was in favor of health-care reform [in
1992-94]. Everybody agreed that the system had to
change. But when it came down to details, few groups
were willing to tolerate provisions that might harm them,
to swallow new regulations, or to sacrifice some profits for
the greater good. [E]ach stakeholder focused on its own
narrow interests and dug in for battle. The result is that
the great health-care debate of the early 1990s expired with
barely a whimper.2 6
To avoid that, Daschle concludes, reformers must unite around a
common message, avoid factional fights over appealing for more
controversial reforms, and, above all, celebrate the role of choice
and competition among private and public insurers to avoid an
ideological battle with pro-market ideologues. 2 7
23. DASCHLE, supra note 1, at 22.
24. Id. at 107-08.
25. Id. at 108.
26. Id. at 99-100.
27. Id. at 42, 198. Another lesson from the Clinton experience addresses
how to deal with interested parties inside and outside the government. Daschle
is particularly insistent that consultation with Congressional committees is
important and, as of 2009, that clearly became the Obama Administration's
practice. See id. at 134-35; see, e.g., Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Demo-
crats Grow Weary as Health Bill Advances, N.Y. TIMEs, Jul. 18, 2009, at Al (report-
ing that "the five Congressional committees working on legislation to reinvent
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III. THE WAY FORWARD
From this reading of history comes Critical's reform strategy
for our time. The Obama Administration-a gleam in Daschle's
eye when writing his book-had to overcome the many "barriers
to reform."" The most obvious for Daschle was an ideological
battle over 'government medicine,' in American politics, the
derisive term orthodox Republicans use to criticize so-called sin-
gle payer plans like Medicare for all. Daschle, like most of the
Washington establishment, rejected such straightforward forms
of universal health insurance as politically unrealistic.29 He
regarded them as appealing in theory, but impossible to enact in
practice. To avoid such useless ideological battles, Daschle
believed feasible reform must be a public/private hybrid. His
hybrid approach to universal health insurance builds upon pub-
lic programs already in place-expansions of Medicaid, the
Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP), Medicare, and the Vet-
erans Administration.so It relies on private employers either to
finance health insurance for their employees or to contribute to
a pool of funds that would pay for their workers' choices among
private and public health insurance plans.s" This requirement of
employer financing is itself a replay of the "pay or play" option
that was the official Democratic Party Platform position in
1992.2
The form of a public insurance plan could, according to
Daschle, resemble the options available to government workers
under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. The
appeal is to create competition between the private and public
health insurance plans. 3 He adds that such competition
requires detailed public regulation to make it fair and at the
same time to avoid the danger of firms competing to avoid the
less healthy.34 This vision of a hybrid plan-with a choice
between public and private plans-is Daschle's proposed way to
move towards universal health insurance without forcing those
content with their current health insurance to change plans.
the nation's health care system delivered bills this week along the lines pro-
posed by President Obama.").
28. Id. at 109.
29. Id. at 144.
30. Id. at 145.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Id. at 77-78.
33. Id. at 146.
34. Id. at 171.
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This strategy-advanced by all three of the leading Demo-
cratic presidential candidates in 2006-08"-reflects a widely
shared understanding (particularly in Washington, D.C.) of the
Clinton debacle: Clinton's reform failed, according to what has
become conventional Democratic Party wisdom, because it
threatened too many Americans with the loss of their employer-
provided health insurance.
This interpretation of the Clinton failure largely explains
the appeal of Daschle's reform strategy. Instead of a single plan
for everyone, he celebrates multiple plans. He notes that coun-
tries like Germany and Japan have reached universal coverage
with many non-profit plans that adhere to common rules. 6
Extending this model to both public and private insurance orga-
nizations requires, in Daschle's formulation, a regulatory over-
haul of American health insurance." To assist that effort, he
promotes a Federal Health Board modeled on the structure of
the nation's Federal Reserve Board." Critical devotes more space
to this idea than any other topic. For Daschle, it is the answer
both to the frustrating debates over what procedures universal
health insurance should fund and to the partisan and ideological
battles that earlier reform struggles have ignited. Experts on
such a board would, as celebrated in the Progressive literature of
the early 20th century," bring disinterested and specialized com-
petence to sort out what is and is not worth paying for in the
changing world of modern medical care.
IV. THE OBAMA APPROACH
The approach to reform adopted by the Obama Administra-
tion-and foreshadowed by Daschle's book-is readily under-
standable, if not fully convincing. To substantiate that skepticism
requires discussion of the arguments for a hybrid model of
expanding health insurance coverage as well as the approach to
cost control that Daschle and the Obama Administration have
favored.
35. See Jonathan Oberlander & Theodore R. Marmor, The Health Bill
Explained at Last, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Aug. 19, 2010, at 61, 61.
36. DASCHLE, supra note 1, at 128.
37. Id. at 136.
38. Id. at 129.
39. See, e.g., Joseph B. Eastman, The Place of the Independent Commission, 12
CONsT. REv. 95, 101 (1928) (describing the Progressive era view of agency offi-
cials as "nonpartisan in their makeup, and party policies do not enter into their
activities except to the extent that such policies may be definitely registered in
the statutes which they are sworn to enforce").
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The case for a public-private hybrid-rather than a single
plan of coverage for the country's citizens-is rooted in Das-
chle's own bitter experience of frustrated reform. He had good
reasons to want to avoid a battle over the dangers of "socialized
medicine," or what is now more commonly called "government
medicine." And it is surely understandable that reformers like
Daschle would be concerned about avoiding inflammatory labels.
The national media, following the journalistic norm of quoting
both sides to assure what is called balance, are indeed likely to
repeat familiar ideological charges against plans modeled on
either Canada's single plan or the expansion of Medicare. A
hybrid, then, is a defensive tactic above all.
The mistake, however, was to believe that a hybrid favored
by a Democratic Administration would escape the familiar ideo-
logical charges about enacting a new governmental insurance
plan. The crucial lesson of the Clinton debacle was not that it
was complicated and unfamiliar, though it certainly was both.
Rather, it was that the Clinton reform, while using the language
of market competition, generated many of the same objections
that earlier versions of more straightforward national health
insurance had awakened. The critics of Democratic plans antici-
pated where reform was headed, not simply what labels the
reformers used. In this respect, trying to avoid a fight by chang-
ing their rhetorical message seemed earnestly hopeful, but his-
torically misguided. Appeals to the dangers of socialism and the
wonders of the American way are always present in debates over
the government's role in providing, financing, and regulating
American health insurance. Denials do not hush these familiar
charges. Competing and compelling counter-symbols are
required instead.
Moreover, the commitment to choice and competition
among many insurance plans brings with it substantial adminis-
trative challenges. It is true that countries like Germany have for
decades managed to regulate large numbers of non-profit sick-
ness funds in ways that restrained both total expenditures and
efforts to 'game' the system's insurance rules. But the United
States depends on states to regulate insurance and cannot rely on
a history of favorable national experience in regulating the
behavior of commercial health insurance firms.
The hybrid reform's reliance on expanding means-tested
programs-like Medicaid and CHIP-entails other predictable
and serious problems. When eligibility ends with the addition of
one additional dollar of income, a program suffers what is some-
times described as falling off a financial "cliff."4 0 And adjusting
subsidies to the changing income of families is both administra-
tively complex and costly. Keeping track of who is eligible for
what level of subsidies, as the Dutch have learned since 2006,
requires expanding their income tax staffs.41 Mandates, it turns
out as well, are hard to enforce.
There is a further question about hybrid reforms. What
kind of public plan satisfies the aspiration for 'fair competition'
among the private and public participants? The insistence of a
powerful public plan prompted intense objections from the pri-
vate health insurance industry. Any promotion of a public insur-
ance option shifts the debate to what advantages the public plan
should or should not be permitted to have. One can reasonably
claim an effective public insurance option requires the same-or
nearly as much-political commitment to the values of social
insurance that Medicare for all represents. But the Obama
Administration began with the hybrid plan as its most liberal
position rather than treating it as one among other possibilities.
That, in turn, truncated the debate sharply, leaving the defend-
ers of simpler and less costly versions of universal health insur-
ance frustrated at being excluded from the range of options
under serious consideration.
Finally, the vision of a hybrid form of universal health insur-
ance in America rested on problematic claims about how the
competition envisaged would work out in practice. The appeal
to a hybrid plan was itself almost unworkably vague. Almost any
form of universal health insurance short of government owner-
ship of hospitals, drug firms, and physician practices would mix
governmental, non-profit, and for-profit organizations. So what
was held up as a virtue created multiple versions of reform, which
required numerous defenses and operating features.
Even more important, the hybrid plan favored by the
Obama Administration depended-for its claims of controlling
costs-on theoretical arguments, and not practical experience.
Where Medicare has subsidized competition among insurance
40. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 35, at 61 (describing the edge of
the "cliff" as being those "who earn less than 133 percent of the federal poverty
level," or $10,830 in 2009, upon which any additional income causes them to
lose their benefit).
41. See Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven & Frederik T. Schut, Universal
Mandatory Health Insurance in the Netherlands: A Model for the United States?, 27
HEALTH AF. 771, 774-79 (2008) (discussing direct government subsidies to
Dutch citizens, the burdens of determining who is violating the insurance man-
date, and the difficulties of determining how to allocate risk through
equalization).
BOOK REVIEW 4892011]
490 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25
firms, the experience was so frustratingly expensive that the
Obama Administration promised to sharply reduce the payments
to Medicare Advantage plans. Furthermore, the limited experi-
ence among wealthy democracies with mandated health insur-
ance and competing private insurers does not support the claims
that competition is effective at controlling costs.
The approach to cost control-for both Daschle and the
Obama Administration-was not convincing on other grounds.
They treated cost control as a technical matter of improving
medical practices. There were persistent claims of cost savings
from better prevention, the spread of health information tech-
nology, increased research on the comparative effectiveness of
medical interventions, or paying for performance (P4P). The
embrace of widely supported goals, including better population
health and improved quality of medical care, has obvious politi-
cal appeal. In theory, these reforms-more research, more pre-
ventive screenings, and better-organized patient data-sound
like benign devices to moderate medical spending. For many
purposes, such reforms are substantively very desirable. But
these reforms are ineffective as substantial cost control mea-
sures.4 2 If the United States is to control health care costs, it will
have to follow the lead of other industrialized nations and
embrace price restraints, spending targets, and insurance regula-
tion. Such credible cost controls are, in the language of politics,
a tough sell because they threaten the medical industry's income.
The illusion of painless savings, however, confuses our national
debate on health reform and has made the acceptance of cost
control's realities all the more difficult. 43
EPILOGUE: THE 2010 HEALTH REFORM: PATCHING UP
THE PATCHWORK
The patchwork features of American health care are crucial
in understanding the complex character and broad scope of the
health reform enacted in March of 2010, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)." That law, hugely controver-
sial and enacted after a bitter ideological debate, can be
42. Theodore Marmor, Jonathan Oberlander &Joseph White, The Obama
Administration's Options for Health Care Cost Control: Hope Versus Reality, 150
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 485, 485 (2009).
43. Id. at 488.
44. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.,
26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). The PPACA was immediately amended
through a reconciliation bill. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
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regarded as a patch on a patchwork, with four major elements.4 5
First is the expansion of health insurance to the uninsured, using
mandates to buy insurance as the regulatory stick, and means-
tested subsidies as the financial carrot. This reform, as Daschle
anticipated, borrowed substantially from the Massachusetts
reform of 2006 and brought with it a commitment to regulating
the behavior of private health insurance firms in the individual
and small group market." The second feature-extensive regu-
lation to prevent insurance firms from practices characteristic of
profit-seeking commercial health insurance-was the expected
companion to the expansion of insurance coverage. According
to the Congressional Budget Office estimates, roughly two thirds
of the 50 million uninsured Americans would be insured by 2014
if the reform were implemented as designed.47 The third feature
of the reform worth notice is its unconvincing cost control strat-
egy. The PPACA proposes reliance on instruments that are
exceedingly unlikely to make much difference to America's med-
ical care expenditures: increased attention to prevention,
expanded research on the comparative effectiveness of medical
innovations, and expanded use of electronic medical records and
information technology generally. No doubt helpful in improv-
ing the quality of medical care decision-making and provision,
none of these measures confront medical inflation seriously
(some predictions of lower rates of increase in Medicare pay-
ments were included in the legislation, but the history of such
projected savings does not support relying on them). The fourth
and most profound feature of the reform is its political strategy
and its implications with the law's implementation. Briefly put,
the 2010 reform reflects more the value preferences of Republi-
can commentators on health insurance than traditional Demo-
cratic formulations of what universal health insurance should be.
The new law takes for granted the patchwork of present arrange-
ments as the starting point. It builds upon them rather than
transforms them. In that sense, the 2010 reform is a "mosaic" of
reform, to use Carolyn Tuohy's more elegant expression for what
Daschle called a hybrid." There is no single overarching model
of medical care financing and provision. Rather, the reform
45. Oberlander & Marmor, supra note 35, at 61-63 (describing reforms
related to subsidies, mandates, regulations, and programs).
46. Id. at 61.
47. Id. at 61-62.
48. Carolyn Tuohy, The Dymanics of Policy Change: Big Bangs, Blueprints,
Mosaics, and Increments in Health Policy in Four Advanced Nations, THE UNIV. OF
B.C. (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.politics.ubc.ca/index.php?id=11086&back
PID=2327&ttnews=2318.
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holds out the aim of universal insurance coverage over time, cov-
erage that is catastrophic in character (leaving considerable
financial risks to families in the form of high deductibles and
copayments). The reform thus tolerates great differences in how
the care of similarly ill Americans will be provided, financed, and
regulated.
The irony is that, while reflecting Republican preferences to
buttress the present world of private health insurance, the
reform failed to secure a single Republican vote in the Senate.
So, to explain the reform rather than describe or evaluate it
requires understanding the institutional structure of American
politics and its substantial status quo bias. Dispersion of author-
ity marks American politics, especially prominent in the sharing
of power among the executive, the Congress, and the courts at
the national level. Added to that are rules-like the filibuster in
the Senate-that permit minorities within Congress (forty-one
votes in the Senate) to block legislation. Facing that context, the
Obama Administration decided to pursue additions to America's
medical system rather than attempt to rationalize it with, for
example, extending Medicare for all. It did so because of politi-
cal realities and the decision to try in the first term to make a
major change. A major change did occur, one that almost did
not happen when one Senator, the well-known advocate of
national health insurance, Ted Kennedy, died in late 2009.
Looking back on the final form of the PPACA, what emerged
after the long debate was largely foreshadowed by the book Tom
Daschle wrote in 2007-08.
